Ulgener

-Dr. M. Fehmi Ulgener
-Aybike Kopuz

Turkish authorities have recently introduced new sanctions, targeting Israeli-flagged and affiliated vessels engaged in maritime transport between Turkey and Israel. However, these sanctions currently apply to all vessels, regardless of their flag or ownership. No formal regulation has been issued regarding these restrictive measures; they are based solely on instructions from the Ministry to Port Authorities.

Vessels that had already loaded cargo and commenced their voyage to Turkish ports before the implementation date of this rule will not be subject to restrictions, provided they submit the relevant documentation. However, this exception does not apply to Israeli-flagged vessels or those carrying IMDG Code Class 1 or 7 cargo, or military vehicles/materials to Israel.

Although there are some differences, it can be said that Turkey applies a similar regime to Israeli-flagged or affiliated or interest vessels as it does to vessels flying the Cypriot flag and interests.

As there is no uniform practice yet, implementation of these sanctions varies slightly from port to port, according to information received from local agents. For example, some ports request information and/or documents regarding the vessel’s owner, charterer, manager, and operator, while others allow vessels to operate with only a declaration.

The new implementation principles can be summarized as follows:

• Turkish-flagged vessels are prohibited from calling at Israeli ports.
• Vessels flying the Israeli flag or affiliated with Israel are not permitted to berth at coastal facilities in Turkey (including port facilities, fishing shelters, marinas, berthing areas, buoy/platform systems, etc.), receive maintenance or repair services at shipyards, boat manufacturing or dry dock areas, arrive at ship recycling facilities, anchor within Turkish territorial waters, or conduct commercial activities such as bunkering, provisioning, taking on water, crew changes, or similar services.

A vessel is considered affiliated with Israel if any of the following apply:

• The vessel is owned by individuals or legal entities, and at least one of the owners or company shareholders is an Israeli national, regardless of the share quantity or percentage;
• Any of the owners or company shareholders reside in Israel or operate a business in Israel, regardless of the share quantity or percentage; 
• Any of the vessel's commercial operator or any commercial/ technical management company listed in the vessel's management agreement (such as BIMCO/charter party agreements) are based in Israel.

Vessels that are neither flying the Israeli flag nor affiliated with Israel are not subject to these restrictions for operating between Turkey and Israel, provided that:

• They do not carry goods for import or export between Turkey and Israel; and
• They do not offload any transit cargo belonging to Israel at Turkish ports.

However, vessels carrying IMDG Code Class 1 or Class 7 cargo, or military vehicles/materials destined for Israel, will be subject to the restrictions outlined above.

If the vessel carries transit cargo, submission of the cargo manifest is mandatory. Furthermore, the vessel’s first and last ports of call must not be Israeli ports.

Direct maritime trade between Turkey and Israel has been restricted by the relevant Ministries.

This means that container lines with Turkish and Israeli ports in their routes do not need to alter their schedules, but they cannot load cargo in Turkey destined for Israel, nor can they discharge cargo in Turkey that was loaded in Israeli ports. Needless to say, war materiel destined for Israel, even if loaded from other ports, cannot be carried as cargo on these ships; this is paramount.

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In cases of innocent or non-stop passage through Turkish territorial waters by vessels subject to these restrictions, the restrictions do not apply in the following force majeure situations:

• Adverse weather conditions, marine accidents, or vessel malfunctions that prevent continuation of the voyage;
• Involvement in rescue operations for persons, vessels, or aircraft in distress, or in situations posing a danger to life and property.

In such cases, immediate coordination with the Directorate General of Maritime Affairs shall be ensured.

During inspections by the Regional Port Authority/ Port Authority for the enforcement of these rules, if any affiliation with Israel is identified in the vessel documents or in the management agreements (whether technical or commercial) submitted with the berthing request, the vessel will not be allowed entry to Turkish ports.

The restrictions do not apply to vessel crew certification or documents. Therefore, Israeli citizens can be employed on vessels that meet the above criteria.

Inspections will be carried out by the Regional Port Authority/ Port Authority and relevant institutions through electronic notifications via the Single Window Port System (LTP), Port Management Information System (LYBS), and Sailing Permit System (SIB). Additional information or documents may be requested from the ship’s agent if deemed necessary, as well as from open sources.

To confirm that there is no Israeli involvement in the management or operation of vessels calling at Turkish ports, the vessel must provide proof by one of the following methods:

• If the vessel is managed by a company, it is necessary to submit the management agreement (particularly the sections identifying the managers and the owners). The parties may redact the commercial and financial sections of the agreement before submission. Alternatively, a “Declaration and Commitment” can be submitted to the Regional Port Authority/ Port Authority. (A draft of this document appears below.) Since the management agreement (usually based on the Shipman standard) also includes the names and particulars of the owners, such a contract serves a dual purpose.
• If no management agreement exists (as is often the case with Russian-flagged vessels and large container lines), a declaration must be submitted by the master through the agent to the Regional Port Authority/ Port Authority.

The above procedure must be performed by the vessel’s agents. Along with the berthing request, agents must provide the aforementioned “Declaration and Commitment” which must be stamped and signed by the master and uploaded through the Single Window Port System by the vessel’s agent.

The document (as suggested by our sources) is as follows:

DECLARATION AND COMMITMENT

TO THE … REGIONAL PORT AUTHORITY, 

We hereby declare, as the agent of the vessel flying the flag of ………………… with IMO number ………………… and named …………………, that:

The owners / operators / technical and commercial managers of the vessel are not affiliated with Israel and the vessel does not carry IMDG Code Class 1 and Class 7 cargoes, nor any military vehicles or materials onboard intended for delivery to Israel,

Neither the vessel’s commercial operator nor any of the commercial or technical management companies listed in the vessel’s managment agreement (BIMCO / Charter Party Agreements) are established in Israel,

The said vessel is not engaged in the carriage of any cargo between Israeli ports and our port, whether for loading or discharging, including transit operations.

We hereby declare and undertake that, should any circumstance contrary to the above be determined, all port expenses and any legal liabilities shall belong to our agency on behalf of master/owners/ managers. [Date]
[Name & Surname of the Master]
[Signature/Stamp] 

According to the information we have received from local agents, if any violation of these principles is detected, the Port Authorities will file a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Administrative sanctions will be imposed under Article 9, paragraph (1)(c) of the Port Regulations on parties who provide false declarations regarding vessels subject to sanctions. Such vessels will be expelled from Turkish territorial waters. If Turkish-flagged vessels are found to be in violation, legal action will be initiated against the relevant parties (owners/operators) under Article 305 of the Turkish Criminal Code.

Conclusion

As a summary, Israeli-flagged or affiliated vessels are prohibited from entering Turkish ports, shipyards, or territorial waters for commercial activities, including bunkering, provisioning, and crew changes. The scope of “affiliation” covers ownership, shareholding, management, or contractual ties with Israeli nationals, residents, or companies. Implementation varies among ports, but Port Authorities now require the management agreement or the prescribed “Declaration and Commitment”.

While non-Israeli vessels may continue to operate, they must not carry Israel-related import/export or transit cargo and must provide relevant manifests or declarations. Exceptions apply only for innocent or non-stop passage under force majeure circumstances, while false declarations or breaches may result in expulsion and administrative sanctions or criminal proceedings under Turkish law. Other vessels are permitted to operate provided they do not engage in direct or indirect trade with Israel, especially involving military or dangerous cargo.

-Tuğba Duygu Yazıcı

Provisional attachment is a powerful interim measure available under Turkish law that allows a creditor, before commencing enforcement proceedings or while a lawsuit is pending, to temporarily freeze a debtor’s assets, including bank accounts. Its purpose is to prevent the debtor from disposing of, concealing, or diminishing assets that could frustrate the satisfaction of a claim. This measure is governed by Articles 257–268 of the Turkish Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law and differs from the specific regime regulating the arrest of ships under maritime law.

A creditor may apply for a provisional attachment when the debt is due and remains unpaid, provided that the existence of the debt can be demonstrated with appropriate documentation such as a contract, invoice, promissory note, or court judgment. Exceptionally, an attachment may also be granted before the debt becomes due if the debtor has no fixed domicile in Turkey, is hiding or transferring assets, is preparing to abscond, or is engaging in fraudulent acts to evade obligations. Such cases, however, are rare and require convincing evidence. 

Before granting the order, the court generally requires the creditor to provide security to compensate for possible damages if the attachment is later found to be unjustified. The amount of this security is left to the court’s discretion, but in practice it is usually set at around 15–25% of the claimed sum. If the court grants the request, the creditor must submit the decision to the enforcement office within seven days, after which the office issues writs of attachment to the debtor’s banks. Upon receipt, the banks are obliged to block the debtor’s accounts and freeze funds up to the amount specified in the order. The funds remain frozen until the conclusion of the main proceedings and are not released to the creditor at that stage.

 Following execution of the attachment, the creditor must initiate the main proceedings—such as enforcement or a lawsuit—within seven days. If the parties have agreed to a foreign jurisdiction or arbitration clause, as in a charter party subject to English law, the creditor must promptly commence proceedings before the relevant forum, and Turkish-translated versions of documents evidencing such commencement must be submitted to the court within seven days. Failure to do so results in the automatic lapse of the attachment.

The debtor may object to the decision or have the attachment lifted by depositing counter-security, upon which the court will review the objection and determine whether to maintain or lift the measure.

In conclusion, while Turkish law allows bank accounts to be frozen for overdue debts, courts grant such orders only rarely, as freezing assets without a final judgment is a highly restrictive remedy. Accordingly, courts require strong and credible proof of the debt’s existence. Evidence that the debtor is attempting to hide or transfer assets to avoid payment is also highly important and may persuade the court to grant

-Gül Alpay

Introduction

The Turkish Court of Cassation’s 11th Civil Chamber delivered an important decision on 28 February 2024 (E. 2023/5322, K. 2024/1569) concerning carrier liability in cases of fire on board and the concept of unseaworthiness. The dispute arose from a claim for damages following a fire that destroyed several trucks and trailers carried aboard a Ro-Ro vessel sailing from Istanbul to Trieste in 2008. The case, which went through multiple rounds of litigation and appeal, revolved around whether the carrier could rely on the statutory exemption from liability for fire under Turkish Commercial Code (“TCC”) or whether the event revealed an initial unseaworthiness that would make the carrier personally at fault and thus liable.

Facts and Claimants’ Arguments

The claimant argued that the fire—starting off the Croatian coast and destroying the entire cargo—resulted from the ship’s defective fire-fighting system, specifically a malfunctioning sprinkler mechanism that failed to activate despite the opening of fire valves. It was alleged that this defect demonstrated the vessel’s unseaworthiness and that the owner bore absolute liability for losses arising from such condition. Damages were claimed for the total loss of eleven vehicles, freight charges, and loss of profit.

The carrier’s defence was two-fold. First, it contended that the vessel was fully certificated and maintained in accordance with international conventions (SOLAS and ISM Code). Secondly, under TCC, it invoked the fire exemption, which relieves the carrier from liability for losses resulting from fire unless caused by its personal fault. The defendant argued that the blaze originated on the main deck from one of the trucks containing diesel fuel, spread rapidly within minutes, and could not have been prevented despite the crew’s efforts.

Decision of Court of First Instance

The court of first instance partially accepted the claim, reasoning that the crew had failed to act promptly and properly in accordance with fire-drill procedures. Evidence showed that the crew first attempted to extinguish the fire using hoses instead of immediately activating the sprinkler system, resulting in critical delay. The court held that the crew’s inadequate training and deviation from ISM procedures rendered the vessel unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. Because the ISM manager’s conduct was attributable to the carrier, this unseaworthiness constituted the carrier’s personal fault, excluding reliance on the statutory exemption for liability in case of fire.

Appeal before the Court of Cassation

On appeal, the 11th Civil Chamber reversed the first-instance ruling, emphasizing that the vessel complied with all national and international safety standards, including valid seaworthiness certificates and properly documented fire-safety drills. The Chamber noted that fires at sea represent inherent maritime perils and that the rapid spread of flames was consistent with the unpredictable and dangerous nature of such incidents rather than with negligence. It further observed that some cargo interests had initiated proceedings before foreign courts concerning the same incident, and those courts had similarly found that the carrier could not be held liable in the absence of proof of intent or gross negligence. The Turkish court adopted a comparable reasoning, finding no causal link between any alleged initial defect and the outbreak of the fire. Accordingly, it concluded that the carrier was not personally at fault and was therefore entitled to exemption under TCC, ordering the complete dismissal of the claim.

Appeal before the Court of Appeal

The claimant appealed the decision further, arguing that the Court of Cassation had misinterpreted the evidence and failed to consider the ISM company’s deficient training as the owner’s personal fault and that the crew’s panic and delayed response could not excuse non-compliance with SOLAS and ISM standards and that the foreign proceedings should not have persuasive value in Turkish litigation.

The 11th Chamber of Court of Appeal, however, held the Court of Cassation’s decision.  The 11th Chamber stated that the vessel had been seaworthy at departure, that the fire resulted from an unforeseeable peril of the sea, and that there was no evidence of the carrier’s intent or negligence.

The decision reinforces a long-standing principle of maritime law: a carrier is not liable for cargo losses caused by fire unless the loss stems from its personal fault or the vessel’s initial unseaworthiness.

This 2024 decision marks a decisive affirmation of the carrier’s statutory immunity in fire-related incidents and underscores the evidentiary burden on the claimant to prove a direct causal link between crew conduct and initial unseaworthiness.

- Arzu Ceren Doğdu

According to the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (“ISPS Code”) emerged as a comprehensive set of international measures designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. The Code was developed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, upon the realization that similar threats could occur at sea, not only in the air. The ISPS Code is therefore regarded as one of the most significant international instruments in the field of maritime security.

Implemented by the IMO under Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the Code establishes a framework aimed at ensuring security between vessels and port facilities. Its foundation rests on the principle that each port facility and vessel must assess potential security risks and determine appropriate measures to mitigate them.

In Turkey, the ISPS Code entered into force on 1 July 2004 and has since been implemented under the Regulation on the Implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, published in the Official Gazette No. 26468 dated 20 March 2007. Since its introduction, international security standards have been integrated into Turkish port facilities, and the preparation and execution of port facility security plans have been carried out under the coordination of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. However, during the implementation process, certain port facilities developed different approaches to financing ISPS related requirements. In some instances, additional fees were demanded from vessels under the names of “ISPS Security Charge” or “ISPS Fee.” Such practices sparked considerable debate, particularly among vessels engaged in international navigation, since the security measures required by the ISPS Code are not considered a commercial port service but rather a public security obligation. Similar debates have also arisen in other jurisdictions, where the question of whether ISPS compliance costs should be borne by port operators or passed on to shipowners has been a recurring issue in port tariff policies.

This controversy was conclusively resolved by the official letter of the Directorate General of Maritime Affairs  of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, dated 30 June 2020 and numbered 38591462 - 455.01.01 - 2020 - 1802, which explicitly stated:

“No tariff shall be established within the list of services offered at port facilities for the collection of any fee under the name of ‘ISPS Security Charge/Fee.’”

This provision constitutes an administrative prohibition. Accordingly, no port facility or terminal operator in Turkey may demand a separate fee from vessels or agents for security services rendered under the ISPS Code. Moreover, this prohibition reaffirms the earlier approval of the now abolished Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs, dated 25 November 2008 and numbered 39108. Therefore, the imposition of ISPS related charges is contrary both to the 2020 Communiqué and to the repealed administrative approval.

This regulation represents a significant step towards ensuring uniformity of application across Turkish ports. ISPS-related security services are no longer considered part of commercial services provided to ships but rather a mandatory responsibility of port facilities themselves. This approach ensures compliance by port operators with their international obligations while preventing unnecessary financial burdens on shipowners and operators. From the perspective of maritime law, this change aligns with the principles of public interest and the balance of international obligations. The ISPS Code is not designed to generate commercial profit but to safeguard security. Consequently, treating security obligations as a source of revenue contradicts both the spirit of the Code and international maritime practice. Moreover, the prohibition aligns with the IMO Member State Audit Scheme, which encourages consistent national implementation of international maritime security measures without imposing undue commercial burdens. The Ministry’s directive strengthens Turkey’s compliance with the global maritime security regime and contributes to a more transparent and equitable port tariff structure.

In this context, under Turkish legislation, it is not permissible to demand any payment from vessels or agents under the name of an ISPS fee. Should such a demand occur, shipowners or agents are advised to report the matter, supported by relevant documentation, to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure and the respective Chamber of Shipping, while reserving their legal rights through payment under protest where necessary. This practice preserves adherence to international maritime security standards and ensures the sustainability of legal and procedural uniformity across Turkish ports.

With the abolition of the ISPS fee, a new era has begun for Turkish ports. Port security is no longer regarded as a commercial service but as a requirement of national and international security standards. This approach enhances the international competitiveness of the Turkish maritime sector, promotes cost predictability for ship operators, and reinforces Turkey’s position as a fully compliant member of the international maritime security framework.